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was "a blunderer ... quacksalver ... 
bungling sorcerer's apprentice," and 
Christ "just an alibi, a man of straw." 
His own adolescent denial of Jesus, 
the protagonist notes, paled alongside 
the deep desolation of the sanatorium 
priest. Sin, for the priest, was "in-
vented by men so they would deserve 
the pain of living, so they would not 
be punished without reason." Prayer, 
for this cleric wrestling with belief, was 
"another solitary vice." Jesus? While 
trying to save dying inmates, the priest 
fights the painful suspicion that "he 
came to save himself, more than to save 
us." God was "not just a house of peace . 
. . . He's also a predator, a heavenly 
hound who follows us and forces us 
and loves us." 
Marta embodies the central enigma 
of Bufalino' s tale. She had survived the 
holocaust: partisans had shorn her 
hair when they caught her with a nazi. 
"Every enigma has its mirror," said 
Longbones, and the mirror in this case 
may be the protagonist/author who 
survived Marta, yet is left with a re-
morse greater than the relief: "I be-
trayed our silent agreement not to 
survive." 
Against the mythic blue sea of 
Palermo, Marta seemed to be the pagan 
"Siren, birdwoman, fishwoman, mer-
maid hidden under the rock." Yet she 
is a jewish woman and when she died, 
"the sluice-gates of God's flood truly 
rumbled, sang in those soiled sheets, 
and there was no dove from which sal-
vation might come." 
At the end, the protagonist/author 
is left "in the middle of the path: a 
squandered seed, deconsecrated sub-
stance, a fistful of earth on which the 
rain falls." And with jumbled emotion: 
"what sad days those were, the hap-
piest of my life." 
In this deconsecrated judeo-christianity, 
the central figure is a pagan/jewish 
crucified woman and sanatorium in-
mates waiting to die who are incapable 
of belief. Yet "the emotion with which we 
learned of others' deaths, as if they were 
our own, was itself love." 
Bufalino's tale, a significant docu-
ment in the history of belief in the late 
twentieth century, has resonances every 
where in Italy. Yet it could not have 
been written by anyone but a sicilian, 
and could not have been located any-
where but on that mediterranean isle. 
LUCIA CHIAVOLA BIRNBAUM 
Inscriptions: Between Phenom-
enology and Structuralism 
By Hugh J. Silverman 
New York and London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987 
"An archeology of knowledge is a 
dispersive practice" (320). This phrase 
aptly defines the hermeneutical and 
semiological practice of Hugh Silver-
man's Inscriptions. So does the follow-
ing description of what constitues an 
archeology of knowledge: 
Instead of tracing a single idea through his-
tory, the archeologist of knowledge looks 
for discontinuous formations. Each forma-
tion will have sets of rules and each group-
ing of sets into systems will establish the 
epistemological signification which Foucault 
regularly calls the episteme. (320) 
This definition sums up very well 
what the reader finds in this clear, per-
ceptive and stimulating work. Husserl, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, 
Piaget, Barthes, Foucault, Lacan, Der-
rida-these are the names that make 
up the groupings that inform Silver-
man's archeology. The aim, however, 
is not the tracing of an idea through 
history through an examination of dis-
parate authors or the delineation of 
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schools of thought that succeed one 
another historically; rather, the tracing 
is of two parallel yet convergent 
methodologies-phenomenology and 
structuralism-to determine their spaces 
of difference and intersection. "At the 
limit of one, signs of the other are al-
ready plotted. At the frontier of the 
other, the former is incorporated and . 
advanced" (ix). In Merleau-Ponty there 
are already positions and interrogations 
that Derrida takes up and resolves: 
"While Merleau-Ponty stands at the 
opening of the place between, Derrida 
formulates its closure" (xii). For this 
reason the readings that set out to de-
scribe this archeology from Merleau-
Ponty to Derrida are more properly 
termed "inscriptions," that is, "essays 
at opening the space of difference" (9). 
They are analyses that mark the attempt 
at re-inscribing itself within the tradi-
tion of continental philosophy while 
re-inscribing this very same tradition 
to better define its place and position. 
The space of this inscription is lan-
guage. It is at this point that phenomenol-
ogy and structuralism, hermeneutics 
and semiology, can be said to intersect. 
Merleau-Ponty's meditation on Saus-
sure's theory of language or the later 
Sartre's emphasis on the written word 
are examples of points of convergence 
that phenomenologically inspired phi-
losophies share in common with struc-
turalist or post-structuralist systems. At 
these points of transition, phenomeno-
logical systems interrogate their own 
postulates and can be said to move to-
ward structuralist positions. In Merleau-
Ponty, for instance, the move in the 
later works toward a conception of 
"non-philosophy" aligns it with the 
"decentering of philosophy" of later 
critical practice. Silverman's focus here 
is on the "conceptual dissemination" 
of a writer's thoughts (123), that is, the 
making of a philosopher in all its man-
ifestations or, as he puts it, "se faisant" 
(123). In this fashion the re-reading of 
Merleau-Ponty underscores those tran-
sitional elements that move toward struc-
turalist and post-structuralist positions. 
In the case of Sartre, the qualitative 
shifting of the relation of self and lan-
guage throughout his corpus makes it 
possible to speak of varying epistemes 
at different stages of his work. These 
are "different stages of thought in which 
the relationship between language and 
self forms different (but comparable) 
structures" (363). 
But Professor Silverman's task is not 
to draw, necessarily and at all costs, 
the common ground between phenom-
enology and structuralism or to show 
how phenomenology moves toward 
structuralism. The space of inscription 
that he delineates is at the same time 
the locus of differences that emerge 
from their con-frontation. While Sar-
tre's critique of human nature and of 
self-surpassing can be cited as concep-
tually compatible with structuralist 
claims (210), his stand on linguistics, 
on the role of the unconscious or on 
the concepts of synchrony and dia-
chrony are incompatible with the views 
expressed on these subjects by Saus-
sure, Lacan and Levi-Strauss, respec-
tively. Silverman wants to show, in 
fact, that Sartre's position points to 
possible limitations in the structuralist 
perspective. Sartre's conception oflan-
guage as "signifying-consciousness ob-
ject-signified relation" (217) situates 
language within human experience, 
making the notion of a psychoanalytic 
unconscious irrelevant. As lived ex-
perience, unreflected or reflective con-
sciousness cannot be structured as a 
language, as Lacan maintains, nor can 
it be formulated as a structure or a 
myth, as Levi-Strauss contends. "Dia-
chrony must prevail and synchrony 
must follow .... Structural knowledge 
is produced by human activity-in-
cluding structuralist activity" (218). It 
is this latter aspect which is determin-
ing. All things being similar between 
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the two accounts, the structuralist al-
ways comes up short on the side of 
human experience. "What they [the 
structuralists] cannot understand is the 
individual's project-this element of 
personalization stands firmly on Sar-
tre's side" (276). 
In the later essays, another key as-
pect of Silverman's inscriptions is de-
veloped. The confrontational analyses, 
which pit the phenomenologist against 
the structuralist in order to essay the 
relational differences, become the 
groundwork for the elaboration of 
more prescriptive notions. In the chap-
ter on Sartre and Piaget, the conceptual 
tension which is described by account-
ing for two opposing theories of 
human development gives way to a 
third that contains them both. "In mov-
ing through this confrontational 
analysis, I will show the groundwork 
for a theory of human development 
which accounts for both the contex-
tualist and the structuralist perspec-
tives" (219). The term given to this 
theory is "multi-contextual experiential 
structuralism" (233), which means to 
account for both the situation in which 
an individual develops and for the 
structural differences that pertain to it. 
"A multi-contextual experiential struc-
turalism brings out all three of these 
aspects: biography, situation, and 
structural identities and differences" 
(235). 
Similarly, out of the confrontation 
between Sartre and Barthes, or be-
tween two conceptions of Writing, Sil-
verman sketches out the possibility of 
a "critical practice of Writing" (253) that 
would account for both the totalization 
and the textualization of Writing that 
they advocate: 
In order to achieve such a signifying critical 
and theoretical practice, it would be neces-
sary to situate both writing and reading at 
the slash, on the line, in the interface be-
tween work and text, between totalization 
and textualization, between problematics 
and pleasures of literature/text. (253) 
And by juxtaposing Sartre and 
Foucault, he similarly establishes the 
place of History: "In this chapter (14] 
I will show that the place of History is 
located at the frontier between Dialec-
tic and Episteme" (254). 
Silverman's theoretical practice is 
one in which theoretical approaches 
(here those of Sartre and the struc-
turalists) are juxtaposed to determine 
a relationality and a difference, namely, 
the boundary at the slash where these 
accounts converge and differ. In so 
doing it neither repeats nor proliferates 
needlessly existential or structuralist 
practice, not is it a synthesis of the two 
or even a third practice. Rather, as a 
practice that would determine the 
limits of the existentialist and struc-
turalist positions, it is offered as an al-
ternative to these critical practices 
"without end" (276). 
The setting of limits as the space of 
inscription of Silverman's theoretical 
practice is then articulated in terms of 
Derridean discourse and of self-decen-
tering. Silverman shows first of all that 
both Sartre and Heidegger can be cred-
ited with having approached the limits 
of metaphysics with a conception of 
self-decenteredness even though they 
remain on this side of its boundaries: 
"Sartre finds no center to man. In this 
respect, his position is similar to that 
of Heidegger. 'Difference' for Heideg-
ger is 'nothingness' for Sartre. Both 
move close to the edge of the epoch of 
metaphysics" (306). Similarly with 
Foucault, whose announcement of the 
nearing of the end of man ushers Der-
rida: "The Derridean de-centering, an-
nounced by Foucault, takes place in 
grammatology" (307). 
In the last chapters, Silverman de-
velops an interpretive typology which 
aims at determining the extent to 
which "heterotopias" (the multiple 
places where we live) take up hyperto-
pian or hypotopian characteristics. A 
hypertopia is a deconstructed utopia 
experienced in the heterotopia of the 
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here and now (331), and a hypotopia 
is the opposite, a de-generate form of 
dystopia, that is, a degraded place that 
exhibits all the shortcomings of human 
places. "Here at the interface between 
desirable places and undesirable ones 
is the locus of social formation, mean-
ing and structure" (332). With refer-
ence to three different types of 
spaces-the Paris Latin Quarter, 
Sartre's No Exit, and a painting by Pin-
turicchio-Silverman shows how these 
heterotopian discourses can be 
analyzed in their relation to "utopian 
pro-jections or dystopian de-jections" 
(337). In all these cases, the deconstruc-
tion of this interpretive topology not 
only opens up the understanding of 
these spaces, but also deconstructs the 
hypertopian/hypotopian opposition in 
order to make explicit, says Silverman, 
"the text of human spatial experience 
[which] is situated at the juncture be-
tween the two" (334). 
The possibility of an archeology of 
heterotopias leads directly to Silver-
man's last and perhaps most crucial 
task: a hermeneutic semiology of the 
self whose task will be "to establish a 
direct correlation between the self as 
interpreter and the system of signs pro-
duced in the interpretation" (338). It is 
in this gathering of the "how" of her-
meneutic interpretation and of the 
"what" of semiological analysis that 
the self is formed . This is because signs 
are signs of an interpretive act, signs 
of a presence and of an actualization 
of the self's sign system which can only 
be recovered through interpretation it-
self (345). 
As Silverman points out in the Intro-
duction, Inscriptions "is not a philo-
sophical treatise. " This qualification 
announces the distancing that distin-
guishes it from a traditional philosoph-
ical investigation . Inscriptions prescribes 
neither a new centering for philosophy 
nor proliferates older ones . Rather, it 
seeks to inscribe the space at which 
philosophies intersect by defining their 
terms and their boundaries. Inscriptions 
is at the same time an archeology of 
knowledge, a theory of typology, a her-
meneutic semiology or, simply, a 
theory of textuality. In other words, it 
is an important work that creates the 
possibility for new areas of analysis 
and requires close scrutiny from all 
those who today engage in the practice 
of theoretical understanding. 
MASSIMO VERDICCHIO 
University of Alberta-Edmonton 
Mosca and the Theory 
of Elitism 
By Ettore A. Albertoni 
Trans. by Paul Goodrick 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987 
There is a tradition in political and 
social theory which consists in large 
measure of the study of the origin and 
consequences of the following fact-
every politically organized society is di-
vided into two classes: a minority of 
rulers, and a majority of subjects ruled 
by them. It is often labeled the elite or 
elitist school, although the term elitism 
is misleading by conveying an anti-
democratic connotation which is not 
necessarily part of the theory; further, 
we do not really have a "school" in the 
full-blown sense that sociologists of 
knowledge deal with. An example of 
an important issue discussed by elite 
theorists is the question of whether and 
how this class division exists in a demo-
cratic society, how elitism conceives 
the difference between democratic and 
undemocratic societies, what is the na-
ture and origin of these ruling and elite 
classes, whether there is any way in 
which this class division could ever be 
eliminated, and what is the relation-
